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INTRODUCTION 
Existing Washington law does not sufficiently safeguard its citizens 
from “rape by fraud,” an action whereby a person obtains sexual consent 
and has sexual intercourse of any type by fraud,1 deception, 
misrepresentation, or impersonation.2 Rape by fraud is a form of sexual 
predation not always prosecutable under existing Washington law.3 In 
recent years, twelve states have adopted expanded rape by fraud statutory 
provisions.4 Presently, Washington’s rape statutes lack the expansive rape 
by fraud statutory language adopted by these twelve states.5 A recent 
sexual scam in Seattle has revealed holes in Washington’s rape statutes.6 
This Note examines the history of rape by fraud, considers criticisms 
against expanding existing rape by fraud statutory provisions, and 
concludes that Washington should adopt expansive rape by fraud statutory 
provisions to better protect its citizens from sexual impersonation, sexual 
scams, sexual theft, and sexual extortion. 
Rape by fraud is perpetrated across six general categories (with some 
overlap): (1) fraudulent treatment, (2) sexual impersonation, (3) sexual 
scams, (4) sexual theft, (5) abuse of authority, and (6) sexual extortion.7 
First, fraudulent treatment, perhaps the most prominent of the categories 
                                                     
* During the summer of 2016, I was a legal extern at the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office’s 
(KCPAO) Special Assault Unit. During that summer, I witnessed some of the enormous challenges 
that victims of sexual assault face in Washington. I was motivated to write this Note in hope of relief 
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 1. Fraud is “[a] knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to 
induce another to act to his or her detriment.” Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 2. Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 48 (1998). 
 3. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.040, 9A.44.050, 9A.44.060 (2016).   
 4. See Jacqueline Syrnick, Challenging the Use of Fraud to Get into Bed After Suliveres v. 
Commonwealth—A Call for Legislative Reform, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 321, 335–36 (2009). 
 5. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.040, 9A.44.050, 9A.44.060. 
 6. See infra notes 59–85 and accompanying text. 
 7. See Falk, supra note 2, at 52. 
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in existing case law, is characterized by fraudulent medical, psychological, 
psychiatric, and religious treatment used to obtain sexual intercourse.8 
Many of the most infamous rape by deception cases involve unscrupulous 
physicians convincing patients that sexual complicity is essential to or 
helpful in providing a needed medical operation or diagnosis.9 
Second, sexual impersonation involves someone who pretends to be 
someone else to fraudulently obtain sexual intercourse.10 Impersonation of 
a significant other is characteristic of this category;11 however, case law 
also provides examples of defendants impersonating famous people to 
obtain sexual intercourse.12 
Third, sexual scams typically involve fraudsters targeting vulnerable 
people, often impersonating agents or producers within the entertainment 
industry, especially pornographic content production.13 Sexual scammers 
sometimes use other techniques to fraudulently induce sexual complicity, 
including operating under the guise of (bogus) scientific research and, in 
one particularly bizarre case, posing as an entranced psychic and 
demanding sex during a séance.14 
Fourth, sexual theft involves one of the most controversial and 
vulnerable classes of victims: sex workers.15 Case law is replete with this 
archetypal description of sexual theft: someone approaches a sex worker, 
offers money in exchange for sex, has sex, and subsequently refuses to 
pay.16 
Fifth, abuse of authority occurs when someone uses occupational or 
social power to obtain sexual complicity.17 Typically, abuse of authority 
cases involve defendants who utilize their positions as educators, police 
                                                     
 8. Id. at 52–64. 
 9. See, e.g., Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356 (Mich. 1872). 
 10. See Falk, supra note 2, at 65–66. 
 11. See id. at 66–69. See generally People v. Hough, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1994) 
(holding that a woman consented to sexual intercourse with a man when he procured her consent by 
impersonating her boyfriend, who was his twin brother, because New York’s non-consent statute 
required proof of force or incapacity). 
 12. See Falk, supra note 2, at 69. 
 13. See id. at 70–74. 
 14. Id. at 75. 
 15. Id. at 76–79. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 79–84. 
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officers,18 supervisors, and employers to leverage sexual complicity 
against victims.19 
Sixth, sexual extortion, which is often closely related to abuse of 
authority, occurs when a perpetrator lacks a formal position of authority 
but, nevertheless, exploits the power derived from his or her relationship 
with the victim.20 Altogether, these six categories represent the scope of 
rape by fraud examined in this Note. 
Washington law affords basic criminal protections against fraudulent 
treatment and abuse of authority, but it lacks the statutory language 
necessary to adequately protect against impersonation, sexual scams, 
sexual theft, and sexual extortion.21 
Part I of this Note examines the disappointing history of rape by 
fraud in courtrooms across the nation. Additionally, this Part reveals that 
Washington rape statutes offer only limited power to prosecute rape by 
fraud. Although most states have narrow rape statutes like Washington, 
twelve states have adopted modern rape by fraud provisions that have 
significantly expanded the protections afforded to victims whose sexual 
consent was obtained by fraud. In Part II, this Note describes the various 
statutory models offered by these twelve states and the Uniform Model 
Penal Code. In Part III, this Note suggests that Washington should adopt 
expanded rape by fraud statutory provisions to enhance human dignity and 
gender equality, and it then considers and responds to criticisms against 
such action. 
I. A LONG AND DISAPPOINTING HISTORY OF RAPE BY FRAUD LAW 
Seminal cases illustrate the historical and ongoing inadequacies of 
most states’ rape statutes. In Don Moran v. People,22 the defendant was a 
doctor who told his patient, a fifteen-year-old girl, that she had to have sex 
with him to save her life.23 Coerced by the defendant, the young girl 
submitted.24 Although the trial court convicted the defendant of rape, the 
                                                     
 18. In 2016, a former Oklahoma City police officer was convicted on eighteen of thirty-six 
charges, including four counts of first-degree rape and four counts of oral sodomy; the jury 
recommended a 263-year sentence because it believed the ex-officer used his authority to prey on 
vulnerable women. Eliott C. McLaughlin, Sarah Sidner & Michael Martinez, Oklahoma City Cop 
Convicted of Rape Sentenced to 263 Years in Prison, CNN (Jan. 22, 2016, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/us/oklahoma-city-officer-daniel-holtzclaw-rape-sentencing/) 
[https://perma.cc/63WW-BF6D]. 
 19. See Falk, supra note 2, at 79–84. 
 20. Id. at 84. 
 21. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 22. Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356, 356 (Mich. 1872). 
 23. Id. at 357. 
 24. Id. at 357–58. 
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Supreme Court of Michigan relied on a definition of rape25 that required 
force against the victim and reversed judgment against the defendant for 
lack of proof of force.26 
Nearly a century later, the Doran Moran opinion was revitalized in 
Commonwealth v. Goldenberg by requiring proof of physical force, 
despite coercive and assaultive conduct.27 The defendant, a doctor, met 
with an unmarried 19-year-old girl who was three months pregnant and 
seeking an abortion.28 The defendant agreed to perform an abortion and 
told the girl that the procedure would span three treatments.29 In the first 
treatment, the defendant had the girl undress, and then he applied a 
vibrator to her genitals.30 He then gave her two injections that stammered 
her speech and made her feel delirious and unable to walk normally.31 In 
the second treatment, the defendant, again, used a vibrator on her genitals 
and gave her another two injections.32 He then told her that he had to have 
sexual intercourse with her and that it “would help in some way.”33 She 
did not tell the doctor no, but she felt dizzy, powerless, and unable to 
control her body.34 The girl later spoke with her friend and mother, 
describing the doctor’s actions.35 Resultantly, she did not return for the 
third treatment and instead contacted the police.36 At trial, a jury found the 
defendant guilty of rape.37 Afterward, the defendant appealed, and the 
court set aside the verdict because there was no proof of force and “it could 
not be found beyond a reasonable doubt that the intercourse was without 
her consent.”38 
Two decades later, in Goldberg v. State, the court continued to 
require proof of force when another defendant faced rape charges after he 
used a sexual scam to obtain sexual intercourse.39 The defendant, a 25-
year-old community college student, approached an 18-year-old girl and 
told her that he was a “free-lance agent and thought she was an excellent 
                                                     
 25. The court defined rape as “the unlawful carnal knowledge, by a man of a woman, forcibly 
(or by force), and against her will[.]” Id. at 359. 
 26. Id. at 364–65. 
 27. See Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 155 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 1959). 
 28. Id. at 189. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 189–90. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 191. 
 39. See Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979). 
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prospect to become a successful model.”40 The defendant showed her an 
ID and convinced her that he was a genuine agent, so the girl agreed to 
meet with him later, and he picked her up in a Cadillac Eldorado 
(unbeknownst to the girl, the car belonged to his mother).41 The defendant 
told her that he was taking her to “a temporary studio.”42 When they found 
that the so-called studio was “closed,” he took her to a condominium that 
he told her they could use instead.43 The girl testified that the defendant 
led her to a bedroom with a large bed and a red velvet bedspread.44 The 
defendant took off his shirt and continued trying to convince her that this 
was all part of the modeling job, but “[she] knew that it wasn’t any 
more.”45 Then, out of fear—she later testified that she was afraid that he 
was going to kill her—she removed her clothes.46 The defendant pushed 
her onto the bed and had sexual intercourse with her.47 
At trial, a jury convicted the defendant of rape.48 The reviewing 
court, however, reversed judgment because, in “the absence of actual 
force, unreasonable subjective fear of resisting cannot convert the conduct 
of the defendant from that which is non-criminal to that which is 
criminal.”49 
Almost thirty years later, a Massachusetts court reprised and 
expanded the Commonwealth v. Goldenberg opinion in Suliveres v. 
Commonwealth by holding that consent induced by fraudulent 
impersonation did not amount to rape.50 In Suliveres, a female complainant 
reported that the defendant had sexual intercourse with her and had 
impersonated her boyfriend after he awakened her in a dark room.51 She 
reported that when the defendant entered the dark room, she assumed that 
person was her boyfriend—in fact, she addressed him by her boyfriend’s 
name.52 Moreover, she reported that she was “‘not fully awake’ at the time 
of penetration” and that, if she had known that the person in her room was 
the defendant, she “‘would have never consented.’”53 The defendant 
argued that the sex was consensual.54 Lacking any rape by fraud statutory 
                                                     
 40. Id. at 1214. 
 41. Id. at 1215. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1214. 
 49. Id. at 1220. 
 50. See Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d 1086, 1091 (Mass. 2007). 
 51. Id. at 1088. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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provision, the jury was unable to reach a verdict and the judge declared a 
mistrial.55 The defendant then moved for dismissal and the court denied 
his motion.56 After the court denied his motion, the defendant sought relief 
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.57 The Court held that 
“[f]raudulently obtaining consent to sexual intercourse does not constitute 
rape as defined in our statute.”58 
Today, similar statutory inadequacies persist in Washington. Six 
women reported that a Seattle man, Mr. Matt Hickey, fraudulently posed 
as a pornography recruiter and lured them to bogus auditions and nude 
photography shoots where he coerced them into having sexual 
intercourse.59 One twenty-year-old woman, Ms. Liz Shearer, alleged that 
Mr. Hickey promised to guide her into the pornographic industry after a 
sex audition “[t]o prove to production companies that having sex with 
someone [she] didn’t know was something that [she] could handle.”60 Ms. 
Shearer had never worked in pornography before, but she was struggling 
financially working as a nanny, so she met Mr. Hickey in a hotel and 
agreed to have sexual intercourse with him for the so-called audition.61 
Afterward, Ms. Shearer reported that “if I had known what was going on, 
I wouldn’t have.”62 
Ms. Allysia Bishop reported that she had been similarly assaulted by 
Mr. Hickey two years before Ms. Shearer’s experience. Ms. Bishop 
reported that Mr. Hickey gave her a similar promise of guidance into the 
pornographic industry, so she agreed to meet with him at his apartment.63 
Ms. Bishop alleged that Mr. Hickey offered her numerous alcoholic 
beverages and told her: “Well, we have to have sex, because if we don’t 
then how am I going to know you’re for real and you’ll actually be able to 
do this in the industry? So you have to prove to me you’re not going to 
bail out.”64 Afterward, she reported that she would never have had sexual 
                                                     
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1089. 
 58. Id. at 1091. 
 59. See generally Info., State v. Hickey, No. 16-1-05400-1 (Wash. Super. Ct.  2016); Default 
Judgment, State v. Hickey, No. 16-2-30379-0 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2016); Sydney Brownstone, The 
Audition, STRANGER (June 8, 2016) [hereinafter Brownstown, Audition], 
http://www.thestranger.com/feature/2016/06/08/24182705/the-audition [https://perma.cc/SZ8J-
N5JP]; Sydney Brownstone, Three Women Say Tech Journalist Matt Hickey Raped Them Outside of 
“The Audition” Scam, STRANGER (July 20, 2016) [hereinafter Brownstown, Three Women Accuse 
Matt Hickey], http://www.thestranger.com/features/2016/07/20/24361423/three-women-say-tech-
journalist-matt-hickey-raped-them-outside-of-the-audition-scam [https://perma.cc/Q6BK-R3XU]. 
 60. See Brownstown, Audition, supra note 59. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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intercourse with him had she not thought that he was genuinely auditioning 
her for work.65 Ms. Bishop left the so-called audition feeling upset and 
violated.66 Later that same day, she slit her wrists in a bathtub; the cuts 
were not fatal and she reported that she has tried to “move on.”67 
At least seven other women have also reported that Mr. Hickey 
sexually assaulted them using alcohol and deceptive pornographic 
auditions to obtain sexual compliance.68 
Following the reports against Mr. Hickey, The King County 
Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (KCPAO) charged Mr. Hickey with three 
counts of Rape in the Second Degree.69 The lack of a relevant rape by fraud 
statutory provision appears to have limited KCPAO’s charges to those 
instances of rape wherein the victims reported that they were incapacitated 
by alcohol and, thus, unable to consent.70 
Mr. Hickey denied all allegations of rape and claimed that the women 
were “into it.”71 KCPAO responded that “[s]uch an excuse might be 
believed with one rape or maybe even two, but after multiple situations in 
which women have accused him of raping them when they were 
intoxicated, the defendant’s excuses are no longer believable. . . . This 
defendant is a danger to the community.”72 
However, without the attendant alcohol,73 KCPAO would almost 
certainly not have had the statutory language necessary to prosecute Mr. 
                                                     
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. (initially reporting that six women accused Mr. Hickey of perpetrating a sexual scam 
against them and raping them); Brownstone, Three Women Accuse Matt Hickey, supra note 59 
(reporting that another three women accused Mr. Hickey of rape). 
 69. Info. at 1–2, State v. Hickey, No. 16-1-05400-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2016). “A person is guilty 
of rape in the second degree when, under circumstances not constituting rape in the first degree, the 
person engages in sexual intercourse with another person . . . [w]hen the victim is incapable of consent 
by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated[.]” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050(1) 
(b) (2016). 
 70. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.040, 9A.44.050, 9A.44.060. “‘Mental incapacity’ is that 
condition existing at the time of the offense which prevents a person from understanding the nature or 
consequences of the act of sexual intercourse whether that condition is produced by illness, defect, the 
influence of a substance or from some other cause.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(4). Washington 
law provides that, for criminal rape convictions, mental incapacity, including incapacity caused by the 
influence of a substance such as alcohol or drugs, may render a victim incapable of consenting to 
sexual activity. Duvall v. Nelson, 387 P.3d 1158, 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). Of note, KCPAO’s 
limited charges may also have been affected by, for example, evidentiary concerns, internal policies, 
and limited resources. 
 71. Prosecuting Attorney Case Summary and Request for Bail and/or Conditions of Release at 
1, State v. Hickey, No. 16-1-05400-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2016). 
 72. Id. (emphasis added). 
 73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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Hickey with criminal rape charges in connection with the sexual scam.74 
Although Washington law provides limited protection against abuse of 
power, sexual extortion (protecting only those with developmental 
disabilities), and fraudulent healthcare treatment, it lacks statutory 
language necessary to fully protect against sexual theft, sexual scams, and 
impersonation.75 KCPAO prosecutor, Ms. Carla Carlstrom, noted that, in 
cases like this, the defendant can simply say that the victims consented and 
“[o]ften that’s why the state isn’t even able to file charges.”76 
Indeed, despite having been accused by at least six women,77 
KCPAO’s criminal rape charges were limited to three counts of Rape in 
the Second Degree against three different women.78 However, KCPAO 
accepted guilty pleas for four lesser charges: Indecent Liberties, two 
counts of Assault in the Second Degree, and Assault in the Fourth 
Degree.79 Mr. Hickey was given a 34-month sentence and placed on a sex 
offender registry.80 KCPAO recommended a 30-month sentence, but after 
hearing the victim statements at sentencing, Judge Roberts ordered Mr. 
Hickey to a 34-month sentence.81 Judge Roberts demonstrated 
Washington’s need for a flexible rape by fraud provision when she stated 
that she would have sentenced him even longer but was “limited by the 
law.”82 
Additionally, the Washington State Attorney General’s Office 
successfully charged Mr. Hickey with civil violations under both the 
Consumer Protection Act and the Commercial Electronic Mailing Act,83 
and the resulting default judgment against Mr. Hickey noted that at least 
six women were subjected to Mr. Hickey’s sexual scam.84 The default 
                                                     
 74. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050(1)(c)(i)–(d). See generally Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 
865 N.E.2d 1086, 1091 (Mass. 2007) (holding that a court may not interpret proof of fraudulent 
coercion as a substitute for proof of force without corresponding statutory language). 
 75. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.050(1)(c)(i)–(d). 
 76. Sydney Brownstone, UPDATE: Porn Scammer and Sex Offender Matt Hickey Sentenced to 
Nearly Three Years in Prison, STRANGER (Jan. 19, 2018, 2:20 PM) [hereinafter Brownstown, Matt 
Hickey Sentenced], https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2018/01/19/25731442/porn-scammer-and-sex-
offender-matt-hickey-sentenced-to-nearly-three-years-in-prison [https://perma.cc/6SYJ-DU9M]. 
 77. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 78. Info. at 1–2, State v. Hickey, No. 16-1-05400-1 (Wash. 2016). 
 79. Presentence Statement of King County Prosecuting Attorney, State v. Hickey, No. 16-1-
05400-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2017). See generally WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 9A.44.100, 9A.36.021, 9A.36.041 (2016 & Supp. 2017). 
 80. Brownstown, Matt Hickey Sentenced, supra note 76. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 21, State v. Hickey, No. 16-2-30379-0 (Wash. 
Super. Ct. 2016). See generally WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.020 (1961), 19.190.030 (1999). 
 84. Default Judgment at 8, State v. Hickey, No. 16-2-30379-0 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2016) (emphasis 
added). Additionally, the default judgment ordered Mr. Hickey to pay $32,201.38 in costs and fees. 
Id. 
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judgment ordered Mr. Hickey to pay a civil penalty of $300,000.00, an 
amount representing no less than 150 violations of the Consumer 
Protection Act and the Commercial Electronic Mailing Act.85 
Next, this Note examines criminal statutes drafted to protect against 
the kind of sexual predation described above. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE REFORMATION 
The American Law Institute (author of the Uniform Model Penal 
Code) has advocated for criminal justice for victims of rape by fraud.86 
The Model Penal Code’s “global consent provision” provides that 
“[u]nless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the 
offense, assent does not constitute consent if . . . it is induced by force, 
duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining 
the offense.”87 
Additionally, twelve states have adopted rape statutes that provide 
increased protections against rape by fraud.88 New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania adopted in whole the Uniform Model Penal Code’s global 
consent provision.89 Another eight states, Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Maine, Missouri, Montana, and North Dakota, adopted a global 
consent provision functionally similar to the Uniform Model Penal 
Code’s, providing that consent is ineffective “if it is induced by force, 
duress or deception[.]”90 Texas and Tennessee adopted unique language 
that is functionally similar to the Uniform Model Penal Code’s global 
consent provision.91 In Texas, “[c]onsent is not effective if . . . induced by 
force, threat, or fraud[.]”92 In Tennessee, “[r]ape is unlawful sexual 
penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by a victim 
[when] . . . [t]he sexual penetration is accomplished by fraud.”93 
                                                     
 85. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 86. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Russell, Adult Impersonation: Rape by Fraud as a 
Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 75, 102 (2007). 
 89. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2–10(c)(3) (West 2018); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 311(C)(4) (West 
2018). 
 90. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7(c)(4) (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-505(3)(d) (2017); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 453(4) (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-235(4) (2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 
§ 109(3)(C) (2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(5)(C) (West 2017); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-2-
211(2)(c) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-08(2)(c) (2017). For an example of a case effectively 
utilizing the Uniform Model Penal Code’s global consent provision, see, for example, State v. Oshiro, 
696 P.2d 846 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming defendant’s rape conviction because the defendant’s 
deception vitiated the victim’s consent). 
 91. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(19) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(4) 
(2016). 
 92. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(19)–(a)(19)(A). 
 93. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503(a)–(a)(4); see also Falk, supra note 2, at 109–10. 
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Additionally, in lieu of sexual penetration, Tennessee provides another 
similar statute prohibiting sexual contact not amounting to sexual 
penetration when accomplished by fraud.94 
Notably, Tennessee created a nuanced, three-tiered, and gradated 
statutory system for charging sexual assault offenses.95 First, and most 
punitively, Tennessee’s aggravated rape and sexual battery statutes 
prohibit unlawful penetration accompanied by the use of force or coercion 
when a defendant is armed with a weapon, causes bodily injury, or has 
accomplices.96 Second, and less punitively, Tennessee’s rape statute 
provisions prohibit sex accomplished by fraud.97 Tennessee law also 
provides that consent is vitiated if it is induced by deception.98 Third, and 
least punitively, Tennessee’s sexual battery statute provisions prohibit 
instances in which the defendant achieves nonconsensual sexual contact 
but not penetration; the statute also protects against related sexual contact 
accomplished by fraud.99 
Tennessee demonstrated the effectiveness of its rape by fraud 
statutory language in State v. Tizard.100 In Tizard, a teenage, male patient 
had visited the defendant, a doctor, on several occasions, and the defendant 
rubbed the patient’s genitals during several of the visits and stimulated the 
patient to climax on one occasion.101 
The court affirmed the defendant’s rape conviction because the 
“defendant used his position as a treating physician with the intent to touch 
the victim’s genitals solely for his sexual arousal or gratification, not for 
medical purposes, and that the touching was accomplished under the guise 
of medical examination . . .  for the purpose of having the victim allow 
such touching.”102 Moreover, the court held if a “physician intends to gain 
access for nonmedical purposes, uses his position as a treating physician 
for such purpose, and the patient allows such access because of a belief 
that it is for medical purposes, we have no problem in concluding that the 
physician perpetrates a fraud upon the patient[.]”103 The Tizard court 
offered glowing praise for its state’s rape by fraud statutory reformation: 
                                                     
 94. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-505(a)(2), (a)(4); see also Falk, supra note 2, at 109–10. 
 95. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-502, 39-13-503(a)(4), 39-13-504, 39-13-505(a)(2), (a)(4); see 
also Falk, supra note 2, at 109–10. 
 96. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-502, 39-13-504; see also Falk, supra note 2, at 109. 
 97. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(4); see also Falk, supra note 2, at 109. 
 98. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(9)(A); see also Falk, supra note 2, at 110. 
 99. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-505(a)(2), (a)(4); see also Falk, supra note 2, at 109–10. 
 100. State v. Tizard, 897 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). 
 101. Id. at 736–37. 
 102. Id. at 742. 
 103. Id. at 743. 
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We believe that the presently existing statutes cure the ills perceived 
in [prior rape by fraud cases] by providing fraud, in its broad 
meaning, as an alternative element to force or coercion for the 
purposes of rape and sexual battery. Also, we are mindful that the 
legislature, for the purposes of our criminal code, has provided that 
consent is not effective when it is induced by deception.104 
Next, this Note concludes that Washington should expand its rape 
statutes and examines which expanded statutory provisions would provide 
the best protection for Washington and similarly positioned states. 
Additionally, this Note examines criticisms against adopting expansive 
rape by fraud statutes. 
III. WASHINGTON SHOULD ADOPT EXPANDED RAPE BY FRAUD 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Washington should adopt expanded rape by fraud statutory 
provisions similar to Tennessee’s provisions because they not only 
provide improved victim protection but also provide gradated flexibility 
that better comports the punitive quality of prosecutorial charges with the 
severity of criminal offenses.105 Alternatively, Washington could 
significantly increase its rape by fraud protection by simply adopting a 
global consent provision—providing that consent is not effective if 
induced by fraud or deception—similar to that of the Uniform Model Penal 
Code and Texas. 
Importantly, the power to expand rape by fraud statutory provisions 
is the exclusive province of the legislature.106 However, during the 2016–
2017 legislative period, the Washington State Legislature introduced zero 
bills with rape by fraud statutory provisions.107 
The Legislature is free to amend the rape statute or create a new 
substantive offense to encompass [rape by fraud], as many other 
States have done. However, where the Legislature has chosen not to 
do so, “[i]t is not for th[e] court . . . to rewrite the clear intention 
expressed by the statute.”108 
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a. Washington’s Rape Statutes Should Reflect Its Commitment to 
Protecting Human Dignity and Women’s Equality 
Washington should expand its statutory rape by fraud provisions to 
better enhance and protect human dignity and women’s equality.109 
Historically, law and society have relied on flawed justifications for 
creating and enforcing rape statutes.110 “[R]ape is predominantly a male 
social practice. As is law. To understand rape law, . . . we should seek to 
understand why men pass laws that purport to outlaw the men who 
rape.”111 
The fundamental historical justification for rape law has been to 
protect men’s property interests in women. The historical construction of 
rape laws places women in a subordinate position as targets of men’s 
sexuality.112 Indeed, the earliest recorded rape laws seemed to indicate that 
the value of a woman’s body belonged not to her but to her father or 
husband.113 In ancient Jewish law, the rape of a married woman was 
punishable by death, but the rape of an unmarried woman was a civil 
offense; it carried the penalty of “fifty shekels” to be paid to the victim’s 
father, and the victim was required to marry the man who raped her.114 
The flawed justification of protecting men’s property interests in 
women is engrained in modern American jurisprudence. Famed jurist 
Judge Richard Posner115 argued that all women, not just prostituted 
women, commoditize their sexuality and exchange it for goods on a sexual 
marketplace.116 Accordingly, rape statutes protect a marriage market 
where women sell their property interest in bodily and sexual integrity to 
would-be husbands.117 
Of course, rhetoric that would commoditize sexuality as a fungible 
good is irreparably flawed “because it detaches from the person that which 
is integral to the person.”118 Nevertheless, Judge Posner recommends 
perilously narrow rape statutes because he believes they advance 
                                                     
 109. See Ben A. McJunkin, Deconstructing Rape by Fraud, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 44 
(2014). “No State shall . . . deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 110. See McJunkin, supra note 109, at 22. 
 111. Id. at 2. 
 112. Id. at 32. 
 113. Keith Burgess-Jackson, A History of Rape Law, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 1, 1–17 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999). 
 114. Id. at 16. 
 115. Judge Posner is one of the most influential judges in American history and is, in fact, the 
most cited legal scholar of all time. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 401, 424 (2000). 
 116. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 202 (3d ed. 1986). 
 117. See id. 
 118. McJunkin, supra note 109, at 31 n.131 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1880–81 (1987)). 
2018] Rape by Fraud: Eluding Washington Rape Statutes 1047 
economic efficiency: “Girls are taught by their parents to be suspicious of 
the blandishments of suitors; and the careful screening of suitors is the 
essence of the optimal female sexual strategy.”119 
Judge Posner’s commentary highlights the degree to which rape laws 
have not been conceived for the paramount interests of promoting human 
dignity and women’s equality. “[T]he institution of rape law mirrors the 
macro-discourse of pop-culture seduction—men’s pursuit; women’s 
choice.”120 Throughout history, narrow rape laws have supported the 
interests of the powerful by legitimizing their pursuit of the less 
powerful.121 Today, narrow rape laws tacitly endorse a contractual model 
of sex that underscores that “it is permissible for men to try to attain sexual 
gratification for themselves . . . and it is the woman’s role to play 
‘gatekeeper’ if she so desires.”122 
Even with respect to the expansion of rape by fraud statutes, statutory 
provisions protecting against spousal impersonation have been used to 
reinforce and preserve male power and the property interests of husbands 
and boyfriends.123 Uniquely, spousal impersonation often renders non-
consent virtually impossible because social customs exert enormous 
pressure on women to make themselves sexually available to their 
husbands.124 Thus, “[f]or men, the resulting sexual conquest [of spousal 
impersonation] is seen as illegitimate” because it negatively impacts the 
property interests of husbands and boyfriends.125 In other words, the 
opprobrium male-dominated law attached to spousal impersonation exists 
not because of rape’s catastrophic effect on human dignity and women’s 
equality but because of rape’s depreciative effect on men’s so-called 
property—their wives and girlfriends.126 
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Perhaps less insidiously, Washington’s inadequate rape statutes 
reflect popular, romanticized notions of seduction and sexuality.127 Some 
critics view rape by fraud statutes as tantamount to the criminalization of 
boyish charms and courtship embellishments. Professor Jed Rubenfeld of 
Yale Law School wrote that “deceptive sex, however bad it may be, isn’t 
that bad.”128 Beyond mere legal commentary, consider the judicial opinion 
of this New York trial judge Judge Edward Greenfield: 
So bachelors, and other men on the make, fear not. It is still not illegal 
to feed a girl a line, to continue the attempt, not to take no for a final 
answer, at least not the first time. . . . Every man is free, under the 
law, to be a gentleman or a cad.129 
The sheer absurdity of these comments and opinions is obvious when 
considered against the reality of Ms. Bishop’s perilous experience 
attempting suicide after having been conned by Mr. Hickey in his sexual 
scam.130 Moreover, compare Judge Greenfield’s commentary with the 
default judgment against Mr. Hickey in Washington’s consumer rights 
violation case: 
As a result of [Mr. Hickey’s] conduct, these women suffered harm, 
including loss of job opportunity, time, effort, money, and an 
intangible loss of bodily integrity and privacy. Women continue to 
suffer loss of privacy because Hickey currently maintains sole control 
of photos that were obtained through his business scam.131 
Washington’s criminal rape statutes should embody the commitment 
to women’s equality and human dignity exemplified by its consumer 
protection laws in the judgment against Mr. Hickey. 
b. Overcoming Criticism Against Rape by Fraud Statutory 
Provisions 
This Note now considers arguments against expanded rape by fraud 
statutory provisions, including popular traditionalist and feminist 
objections. 
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1. Traditionalist Objections to Rape by Fraud Statutory Provisions 
Legal scholar and educator, Ms. Vivian Berger, suggested that many 
of the men engaged in sexual theft are despicable characters but should not 
be considered rapists.132 Ms. Berger explained that she has “minimal 
sympathy for the idea that the law should protect, via criminal sanctions, 
the cheated expectations of women who sought to sleep their way to the 
top but discovered, too late, that they were dealing with swindlers.”133 In 
short, this view is that sexual theft may be bad, but it is not so bad as to 
merit criminal sanction. 
Legal scholar and educator, Mr. Donald Dripps, argued that the 
expansion of rape by fraud statutory provisions would violate public 
policy by using the state to enforce quasi-contracts for illegal 
prostitution.134 In short, this view is that the law should not be a payment 
enforcement mechanism for illegal financial activity related to prostituted 
persons. 
However, these arguments misunderstand the scope of rape by fraud 
statutory provisions and fail to appreciate the humanity and vulnerability 
of sex workers. Ms. Berger’s dehumanizing rhetoric advances the “myth 
or stereotype that a prostitute’s consent to sex is less worthy of protection 
at criminal law than is that of other wom[e]n.”135 “If anyone needs criminal 
protections against material fraud, street sex workers do.”136 Perhaps “the 
real reason not to recognize rape (or battery) under these circumstances is 
that society often views the prostitute’s behavior as immoral and 
illegal.”137 Regarding Mr. Dripp’s objection, the rape by fraud statutory 
provisions recommended by this Note would not guarantee financial 
exchanges between buyers and prostituted women—rather, the provisions 
would work to guarantee the equal protection of vulnerable prostituted 
women and children from the predatory opportunism facilitated by 
existing law. 
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2. Feminist Concerns about Rape by Fraud Statutory Provisions 
Some prominent feminist scholars are skeptical of rape by fraud 
legislation because they believe it tends to make “it more difficult for 
women to promulgate new images of female sexuality.”138 Other feminist 
scholars are concerned that rape by fraud legislative schemes tend to 
exclude vulnerable sex workers from their protection.139 
First, the purpose of rape by fraud legislation should not be to restrict 
female sexuality; it should be to expand female sexuality beyond the 
constructed role of buyer and seller on a so-called sexual marketplace.140 
Next, Washington can and should articulate an intention to protect 
vulnerable sex workers from sexual thievery without endorsing or 
legitimizing prostitution. Because of the stigma so widely attached to 
prostitution, victims of sexual theft often lack both social support and legal 
recourse.141 The Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network commented that the 
“criminalization [of prostitution] reinforces the stigma associated with 
prostitution and pushes sex workers to the margins of society[.]”142 In turn, 
this “reinforces the attitude that sex workers ‘deserve what they get’ when 
they are beaten up or murdered [and] creates an environment in which 
brutal forms of exploitation of sex workers can take root[.]”143 
The exploitation of vulnerable sex workers is, in part, facilitated by 
a legal system that has routinely failed to offer its protections to sex 
workers. Indeed, apart from the lack of criminal protections examined 
above, even the highly influential Restatement (Second) of Torts bluntly 
advocates for a denial of recourse for prostituted victims of fraud: 
1. A, to induce B to submit to intimate familiarities, offers her a 
paper which A represents to be a twenty dollar bill but which he 
knows to be counterfeit. B, believing the paper to be a genuine bill, 
submits. A is not liable to B for battery. 
2.  The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that the paper is 
offered if B will submit to a blood transfusion. A is subject to liability 
to B for the harm done by the operation to which A has fraudulently 
induced him to submit.144 
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Washington law should not condone the use of fraud to coercively 
obtain sexual intercourse.145 “It is time to understand the law of rape 
differently. . . . The use or threat of physical violence is just one way 
men force women they know to have sex with them.”146 “Men also use 
other kinds of threats, such as to leave women stranded, to publicly 
humiliate them, and to fire them from their jobs.”147 “Threats and 
deceptions that would be prohibited by laws against extortion, fraud, 
or false pretenses as a way to obtain money should be prohibited by 
rape law as a way to obtain sex.”148 Washington should “let go of the 
sexism of the past, and . . . condemn, not condone, coerced and 
nonconsensual sex.”149 
CONCLUSION 
Washington should reform its rape laws to protect against rape by 
fraud, a form of sexual predation not always criminally prosecutable under 
existing Washington rape statutes. Twelve pioneering states and the 
Uniform Model Penal Code have identified legislative solutions, the best 
of which is Tennessee’s statutory scheme because of its gradated 
flexibility. The adoption of expanded rape by fraud statutory provisions 
would not only improve Washington’s ability to protect against abuse of 
power, sexual extortion, and fraudulent treatment, but it would also create 
new criminal law protections against sexual theft, sexual scams, and 
impersonation. 
Statutory provisions that protect against rape by fraud enhance 
human dignity and safeguard women’s equality. Although some critics are 
worried that the adoption of Tennessee’s rape by fraud statutory scheme 
would be tantamount to a state endorsement of prostitution, Washington 
has a paramount obligation to extend equal protection of the law to sex 
workers. In doing so, Washington does not have to endorse or facilitate 
illegal sex work. Additionally, other scholars are concerned that rape by 
fraud statutory provisions may restrict female sexual expression. 
However, Washington can overcome this by using expanded rape by fraud 
statutory language to enhance and protect female sexuality, challenging 
the perception that women’s sexuality is a mere commodity on a sexual 
marketplace. Finally, other scholars are concerned that rape by fraud 
statutory provisions would not protect prostituted women, but Washington 
can and should recognize the humanity and vulnerability of sex workers—
and it can do so without securing related illegal exchanges. 
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Although Tennessee’s statutory scheme is the most nuanced model 
available, Washington could craft legislation tailored to its unique needs 
or adopt select provisions from other states and models. Importantly, 
expansion of this law is not the province of the judiciary—only the 
legislature can remedy the inadequacies of Washington’s current rape 
statutes. The Washington legislature should adopt expansive rape by fraud 
provisions to protect against the broad range of fraudulent and dishonest 
conduct used to obtain sexual complicity. 
